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Abstract 
 
Economists have recently produced theories and evidence concerning the role of social preferences 
in various circumstances of economic behaviour. This has meant that in addition to selfish 
preferences for one’s own material payoffs, economists have become increasingly interested also in 
investigating one’s preferences for material and nonmaterial payoffs of the opposing side, or the 
parties involved, in general. A recent branch in this research is built on the contractarian aspect of 
behaviour: are we willing to follow the rules we have collectively agreed upon? A case in point is 
the work by Sacconi and Faillo (2005) which shows that a remarkable portion of the players in an 
exclusion game shifted from a selfish strategy towards an equal division of monetary payoffs after 
they jointly agreed upon the sharing rule (of an equal division) and had good reasons to expect that 
their opposing players also agreed upon the rule. This paper studies the Sacconi-Faillo model by 
taking into account the players’ process-regarding preferences in selecting the sharing rule. It also 
illustrates the measurement of procedural fairness with an analysis of empirical data gathered in a 
small-scale piloting experiment. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Let me predict the outcome of the systematic and comprehensive testing of 
behaviour in situations where self-interest and ethical values with wide verbal 
allegiance are in conflict. Much of the time, most of the time in fact, the self-
interest theory…will win (Stigler 1981, 176). 
 
During the last two decades economic theorists and experimental economists have produced 
empirical evidence and theories which cast, at least when interpreted broadly, serious doubts on 
Stigler’s prediction above. Indeed, in most of the reports on experiments, self-interest motivation is 
outrun by various types of ‘other-regarding’ motivation, such as rewarding and punishing, 
contributing to a public good, as well as reciprocity and altruism. Recently, a more felicitous 
counterexample to Stigler’s assertion is stated in terms of the conformist preference theory by 
Grimalda, Sacconi and Faillo (Grimalda and Sacconi 2002; Faillo and Sacconi 2007). The theory 
sees individuals as seeking compliance with a moral principle conditional to the belief that also 
other individuals seek similar compliance. The theory has implications for many real-world 
problems predominated by incomplete and/or informal contracts. These problems are often 
characterised as social dilemma situations typical in economic activities under labels such as 
education, health care, natural and recreational resources, public television, regulation, 
organizational performance and other uses of shared resources where the individual and collective 
interests are at odds.1 
 
This paper contributes to the research agenda commenced by Faillo, Grimalda and Sacconi.2 The 
major aim here is to show, if only tentatively, that, in situations where conformity to a norm is a 
crucial source of individual motivation, people may also value the fairness of the processes in which 
the norm is jointly agreed. The view adopted in this paper emphasizes the so called voice-dimension 
of collective decision-making. This refers to the extent to which those who are affected by a 
decision have an opportunity to contribute to, or be involved with, the decision-making procedure 
(Dolan et al. 2007; Anand 2001). Presumably, this dimension has a bearing on the fields and topics 
mentioned above in the context of the conformist preferences theory.3 Another purpose of the paper 
is to study, in the context of the exclusion game, other factors of behaviour than conformity and 
fairness – namely, other-regarding preferences (altruistic motivations), reliance on the rationality of 
                                                 
1 Conformist preference theory is applied to non-profit organization analysis by Grimalda and Sacconi (2005) 
and to corporate social responsibility problem by Sacconi (2007).  
2 See Grimalda and Sacconi (2005), Faillo and Sacconi (2007) and Sacconi and Grimalda (2007). 
3 Benz (2005) mentions (i) consumption, (ii) work and employment, (iii) democratic participation, (iv) public 
good allocation, (v) taxation, (vi) redistribution and inequality, (vii) organizations, and (viii) law as areas of 
empirical relevance. 
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others, and the esteem of independence of others’ behaviour. To be sure the main interest is in a 
preliminary analysis and in piloting the devices that were applied in measuring these factors. 
 
 
2. Theories of social, procedural and conformist preferences 
 
2.1. Overview 
 
In response to the outcomes in experiments where the behaviour of subjects has quite often deviated 
from the ‘self-regarding preferences model‘ of standard economic theory4, economists have 
formulated theories of what they call social preferences. The following simplified scheme illustrates 
the overall conceptual structure of utility functions in these new theories: 
 
Utility ≡  material payoff  
+ s1 x (aversion to disadvantageous difference in payoffs)  
+ s2 x (aversion to advantageous difference in payoffs)  
+ s3 x (kindness | expectation of the other’s behaviour)  
+ s4 x (conformity to a shared norm | expectation of the other’s conformity). 
 
The scheme suggests that a person experiences utility, or derives pleasure, from the components in 
her utility function. In the utility theory’s manner of speaking the person assigns real numbers (utils) 
to (i) items in her own material payoffs or consumption bundle, to (ii) the distance of her payoffs 
from the fair level of payoffs, to (iii) kindness (or maliciousness), conditional to her expectations 
considering the intentions of the other player(s), and to (iv) her conformity to an ideal or a shared 
norm, conditional to her belief of the conformity of the other player(s) to the ideal.5 In addition, the 
scheme suggests that the impact of the other components of the function except the material payoffs 
are mediated by the corresponding sensitivity coefficient, labelled as s1,..s4 and in the scheme. This 
indicates that the strength of the impact of one particular component can vary between individuals 
and across situations. It may also take the value of zero, which means that in a particular situation, 
or for a particular person, the impact of that component in the utility function is zero. Accordingly, 
when a sensitivity coefficient becomes high enough, a person may choose to take another course of 
action than if she were motivated solely, or dominantly, by her self-interested material outcomes. 
 
                                                 
4 The term ‘self-regarding preferences model’ comes from Cox (2004). The term makes it easier to see that 
experimental or other empirical findings which are inconsistent with this model need not be inconsistent with 
standard economic theory as utility functions can be defined as including others’ payoffs in addition to one’s 
own payoffs.  
5 Note that items (iii) and (iv) are modeled on the psychological games framework by Geanakoplos et al. 
(1989) where utilities are derived directly from beliefs. 
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In addition to the above scheme we can add a fifth component in the utility function by considering 
the fact that people often have process-regarding preferences. This means that people care how 
things and outcomes come about. A quite well-known demonstration of this is ‘Machina’s mom’ 
example where a mother who has one candy to be given either to her son or to daughter, and who 
decides to flip a coin to decide which one of the children will receive the candy (Machina 1989; 23-
24; also Trautmann 2007). In the example the mother regards coin-flipping as a fair procedure of 
making a decision whereas the son sees it as unfair. As is the way with social preferences, the 
strength of the impact of process-regarding preferences varies between individuals and across 
situations.  
 
Figure 1. Theories of preferences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is currently an array of theories of social preferences. Figure 1 is an attempt to organize these 
theories into a tentative typology according to the following criteria: (i) are preferences related to 
Preferences 
Tastes/valuations of 
’things’ 
Selfish preferences 
A person’s own material 
payoffs/ consumption bundles 
Social preferences 
How a person ranks different 
allocations of material payoffs to 
themselves and to others
Procedural preferences 
How things/outcomes come 
about 
Standard 
EUT and GT 
 
Inequality aversion 
theories 
One’s own payoff 
compared to relative 
payoffs.  
Fairness (reciprocity) 
equilibrium theories 
One’s beliefs on other’s 
kindness 
Various 
auxiliary 
hypotheses 
type of 
arguments. 
Bolton 1991;  
Fehr and 
Schmidt 1999; 
Bolton and 
Ockenfels 
2000; 
 
Conformity with a 
shared rule 
Faillo and Saccioni 
2007; 
Sacconi and Faillo 2005;
Grimalda and Sacconi 
2005 
 
Bowles 2004; 
Anandt 2001; 
Ben-Ner and 
Putterman 1999  
Rabin 1993;  
Sally 2002;  
Falk and 
Fischbacher 1998 
 
Some examples 
• tipping 
• charity 
• voting 
• voluntary unpaid work 
• working harder without money incentives 
than with money incentives 
• contributing to public goods 
• costly punishing of free-riders 
• making generous offers in ultimatum games 
(and rejecting ungenerous offers) 
• punishing and rewarding the opponent player 
according to his/her behaviour 
• cooperation in a prisoner dilemma game 
• punish those who violate a shared norm 
• pure altruism (improving the wealth of others) 
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one’s own material payoffs, to the allocation of material payoffs, or to the process from which the 
payoffs come about; (ii) does a theory account for interactive expectations or not, and (3) do the 
preferences concern moral and ethical values or not. This typology helps us in understanding the 
main differences in the theories and in seeing the procedural and conformist preferences within a 
broader theoretical context. 
 
Although a detailed account of the typology lies outside the scope of this paper, it can be noticed 
that all existing theories are based on methodological decisions to focus on particular components of 
utility and to ignore the other components. For example, reciprocity theories focus on material 
payoffs and reciprocity considerations while inequality aversion theories focus on material payoffs 
and differences in payoffs. A related fact is that so far as more psychology is brought in to these 
theories there emerges the dividing line between fixed vs. constructed preferences. That is, things 
such as fairness and norm compliance can be brought into the model of economic behaviour by 
assuming that people have ‘ready-made’ preferences towards these things. Thus, when people enter 
various decision-making situations they then consult exactly these ready-made preferences to make 
their decision. The standard expected utility theory and game theory, as well as many inequality 
aversion theories, operate just in this manner. On the contrary, Rabin’s fairness equilibrium theory 
and the conformist preference theory operate by assuming that context matters. In other words, the 
theories assume that people have preferences that depend on what the others expect her to think or 
do (see, for instance Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis 2004, ch 7 and Bruni and Sugden 2007).  
 
An important fact is that experiments have had an important role in the development of the 
theorizing on social preferences. As has been argued by Sugden (2005) and Santos (2006), these 
experiments can be characterised as ‘experiments as exhibits’ aka ‘behavioural experiments’. These 
characterisations point to the fact that typical experiments, where social preferences are investigated, 
include causal factors and mechanisms that are not ‘built into’ the theory that is currently tested (in 
addition to the factors and mechanisms which are included into the theory). Therefore, these 
experiments produce new knowledge on human behaviour and they result quite often in ‘new 
findings’, ‘deviations’, ‘anomalies’ etc. This capacity of behavioural experiments explains why 
there are currently several theories of social preferences as explanations of human behaviour which 
deviates from the predictions of the standard theory. The characteristics of behavioural experiments 
motivate also the study reported in this paper – viz., the operation of causal factors other than 
conformity in the context of the exclusion game.  
 
The discussion on theoretical approaches and modelling principles continues to be vivid and also 
new theoretical ideas and extensions of theories and models appear almost all the time. Therefore 
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the above account excludes some of these new ideas. A recent hybrid model is Trautmann’s (2007) 
process fairness model combining process-regarding preferences to the original Fehr-Schmidt model 
of inequality aversion. Another such model is presented by Charness and Rabin (2002) who 
combine social welfare preferences and reciprocity preferences with the player’s material 
preferences to conceptually map the behavioural patterns found in experiments. A more radical view 
is that by Gold and Sugden (2007) which outlines a model for team reasoning in explaining some 
puzzles of game theory.  
 
 
2.2. Process-regarding preferences 
 
Like social preferences also process-regarding preferences have been known to economists for a 
long time, although they have been almost totally neglected in economists’ theories and models. The 
term ‘process-regarding preferences’ is here taken to mean that people do not only care about 
outcomes but they also, and sometimes mainly or even exclusively, value the processes and 
conditions where the outcomes come about. For example, consider the Machina’s mom example 
introduced above. In the example, the mother cares about the fairness of the process (of allocating a 
candy to one of her two kids) while the kid who was left without a candy considers the outcome 
fairness, and also, if complaining of the way the mother made her decision, also the process 
fairness6. The relevance of including process-regarding preferences into the theories of social 
preferences is apparent. Indeed, there is a ‘shortage’ of models that could explain the data that 
cannot be accommodated by inequality aversion theories or reciprocity theories (Sen 1997; 2000; 
Frey et al. 2003; Bolton et al. 2005; Trautmann 2007). 
 
An illustrative example is provided by Lind et al. (1993; see also Frey et al. 2003), who investigated 
a situation where litigants faced a conciliation procedure in the end of which the court orders an 
award. The disputing parties can accept the award or reject it and go to trial. The litigants therefore 
balanced instrumental outcomes of the process against the fairness of the arbitration procedure. The 
result of the investigation was that the litigants who regarded the conciliation procedure as fair were 
more likely to accept the court-ordered award (ibid.).  
 
                                                 
6 As for another example, consider Sen’s (1997, 758-9) Chinese doctor case, where Dr. Chang, who works in a 
remote rural area in China and has one unit of medicine to be given either to sick child A or B. The medicine 
unit would save A’s life with a slightly higher probability than it would save the life of child B. Dr. Chang’s 
most preferred option is not to make a personal decision that would deny the medicine to one of the two 
children. What would be a proper mechanism or process through which a fair decision is to be made? 
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Another illustrative example of procedural fairness concerns the health care rationing. Think about 
priority setting decisions which are made by doctors and health care authorities and the outcomes of 
which influence patients and public. Doctors and authorities are here strong actors whose 
preferences and interaction determine the outcomes the patients, the weak actors, get from the 
operation of the health care organization. In Wailoo and Anand’s (2005) survey research the 
respondents (who represented patients and public) agreed that procedures are important, especially 
they emphasized the idea that patients and public should be consulted before making health care 
priority settings. This suggests that the customers of health care organizations do not only care about 
the health consequences of the operation of the organizations but also about the fairness of the 
procedures from which the outcomes come about. By including into his view the idea of conformist 
preferences and ethical rules of taking care of also the weak actors in the society, we come to the 
following question: can the ideas of procedural fairness and conformist preferences be included into 
society’s attempt to design institutions and organizations that reflect the preferences of all parties 
concerned? Furthermore, could the consideration of processes and conformity bring about better 
social benefits than institutions and organizations designed only by the strong actors?  
 
Consider then a more abstract case called a three-person exclusion game with a sharing rule7. In a 
basic exclusion game two active players make their own individual decisions to take a share of the 
‘cake’. The passive third player gets the rest of the ‘cake’, possibly nothing. The situation raises the 
following considerations: would you take as much as possible without thinking the other two 
players; or would you guess what the other active player will do and do the same; or would you take 
less to yourself to ensure that the passive third player gets something? In the game with a sharing 
rule, the players first agree collectively, and without knowing their roles in the later phases in the 
game, on a rule according to which the problem of ‘cake-sharing’ should be solved. Then each 
player makes her individual decisions in situations where each player solves the ‘cake-sharing’ 
problem individually without any feedback on other’s decisions, or possibility to signal or negotiate. 
As a player of such a game you probably would like to draw on the collectively agreed sharing rule, 
at least if you expect the others will do the same. This, indeed, is the contractarian element of the 
game: are you willing to follow the rule which you have jointly agreed with others? 
 
A three-phase exclusion game combines the above sequences: first, playing the game without any 
explicit rule; second, collectively selecting a rule (and constituting a ‘society’); and third, playing 
the game with the selected rule (in a ‘society’ just constituted). It is hypothesized that not only (i) a 
                                                 
7 This example conceptually describes the experiment which is reported below. In the conceptual description 
we ‘investigate’ what causal factors would work in such a simplified situation while in the experiment we 
study, what will happen when real people behave in such a simplified but real situation.  
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player’s beliefs of how the other players will behave (follow the collectively chosen rule or to 
deviate from it) influence on a player's behaviour but also (ii) her perception of the fairness of the 
process of collectively choosing the rule will affect on what she believes the others will do and on 
what she herself will do. As will be explained in section 2.3, the first influence is added to an 
individual's utility function in the conformist preferences theory by Grimalda and Sacconi. The 
second influence is preliminary explored in subsection 3.5.3. 
 
The idea, that individual behaviour is affected by the perception of the fairness of the procedure by 
which a group makes its decision, needs to be theoretically justified. At least one should comment 
on the psychological plausibility of the argument. A short justification provided here refers to the 
original instrumental value of a particular procedure which, however, has transformed during the 
(social) evolution of the procedure so as to have both an instrumental and inherent value, and even 
only an inherent value (Anand 2001; see also Sen 1997, 749). For example, a coin-flipping method 
has its original value as a means to make decisions but it also has an inherent fairness-value.8 The 
general point, however, is that the concept of procedural fairness is observable and falsifiable: its 
influences can be measured and it is possible to find situations where it does not play a role.9 
 
 
2.3. Conformist preferences theory 
 
In the context of social and economic interaction conformity refers to one’s adjusting to norms, 
ideals, principles, or standards. That is, shared norms (and its counterparts mentioned) help us in 
situations where we do not solely, or at all, act to satisfy our desires. A telling example is the traffic 
rule saying that ‘give way to traffic coming from the right’.10 This rule, when shared by all drivers 
(and known by pedestrians) coordinates perfectly the traffic at crossroads. The point is that when 
you are in a bounded rationality situation, where you cannot use your computational power to form 
expectations of what the others will do (by regressing in the style ‘think what others think you are 
thinking what they are thinking’ and so on), the shared norm makes the forming of your expectation 
possible. Conformity with the norm is often a good response for all participants of the ‘game’ and it 
is often, but not always, secured by laws and informal rules with or without sanctions (see Bowles 
2004, 47-48). Bicchieri (2006), for instance, argues that even if the conformity with a norm leads to 
choices that are against the person’s self-interest, the person conforms to the norm if (i) she is aware 
                                                 
8 For example, Pommerehne et al. (1997) studied people’s attitudes towards various collective decision 
mechanisms in a hypothetical situation of placing a nuclear waste repository. They found that nearly 60% of 
the respondents were in favor to engineering mechanism and only 26% to a lottery mechanism. 
9 On a more profound account, see Benz (2005).   
10 This example comes from Hargreaves Heap (1992).  
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of the norm, (ii) she thinks a sufficient number of other players obey the rule, (iii) other players 
think the person ought to conform or a sufficient number of other players are ready to sanction her 
for not obeying the rule.11 
 
In the traffic rule example above there are clear material benefits (the avoidance of a crash and its 
losses) which give a reason to a driver to conform the rule. The literature on why individuals deviate 
from the standard theory of rational choice, points, however, to the fact that very often the deviating 
behaviour is in contrast with the self-regarding material preferences of individuals. Accordingly, 
these theories typically focus on various social dilemma situations, where individuals’ pursuit of 
self-interest is contradictory to the common interest of a group, organization or society. In this 
context the role of a rule is contractarian: which rule should be selected collectively, and how it 
should be selected in order to get people to cooperate for mutual benefit. If we assume that 
individuals are rational, each player of the game prefers the outcome where her ends are accepted by 
everyone; but since this would usually not lead to an agreement, individuals can be seen as willing 
to make concessions to reach agreement (Sugden 1993). Therefore, individuals would trade-off their 
own material payoffs against benefits from reaching agreement. These benefits may come from 
various sources, such as avoidance of penalties, enjoyment of solidarity, or pleasure of complying 
with a rule and so on. 
 
The above account of some dimensions of norms gives a proper background to understand the so 
called conformist preference theory by Grimalda and Sacconi. Grimalda’s and Sacconi’s thrust for 
their theory is in combining a player’s intrinsic motivation to act according to a shared principle 
with the player’s consequentialist (selfish and material) preferences. They then construct what they 
call a comprehensive utility function where the utility depends on the player’s material payoffs and 
the (dis)utility coming from the degree of one’s conformity to a shared principle. Thus, the utility 
function consists of a non-consequentialist aspect in the sense that the preference to conform the 
shared ideal need not consult the player’s preferences for her material payoffs. Instead, ones’ 
preference to conform is contextual – that is, it depends on what the other party expects her to think 
and do. In consequence, the conformist preference theory explains why subjects in an exclusion 
game experiment change their behaviour after they have jointly agreed a norm. This behavioural 
pattern is not explained by the inequality aversion theory or the fairness equilibrium theory. 
 
Grimalda and Sacconi present the general form of their comprehensive utility function as follows12: 
 
                                                 
11 Regarding the role of norms in the self-regulation by network-effects, see Aviram (2003). 
12 The presentation of the model follows Sacconi and Faillo (2005) and Faillo and Sacconi (2007). 
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 )]([)()( σλσσ TFUV iii += , where 
=σ  actions for the players; 
=)(σiU player’s i material, consequentialist utility; 
=)]([ σλ TFi  player’s i ideal (non-consequentilist) utility which reflects i’s concern to the 
conformity with the shared norm in the function T; 
=≥ 0iλ  weight parameter which expresses how important the conformist component is for i; 
F = function which transforms social normative criterion into individual ideal utility; 
T = ’social welfare function’ (takes a value for each state σ ).  
 
The authors then present the definition of T with a Nash social welfare function. The idea in this 
definition is to provide ‘metrics’ for calculating the values of possible states of affairs. This results 
in an ordering of the possible states of affairs an impartial spectator would give on the basis of the 
social normative criterion (also Grimalda and Sacconi 2005). Furthermore, it is assumed that the 
ordering is shared by all actors who are involved into the ‘game’. The exclusion game example 
makes this idea more concrete. There players select the social normative criterion (the sharing rule) 
in phase two. Let us simplify the selection by assuming that there are two rules, high (h, which 
means here ‘as much as possible to two active players’) and low (l, which means here ‘equal shares 
to all three players the passive one included’). If the players jointly select the rule low, the rule low 
serves as the basis of the metrics calculation on the grounds of the Nash welfare function. This 
‘metrics’ then produces the ordering N(l, l) > N(l, h) >  N(h, h), where the expressions ‘N(. , .)’ refer 
to the values the welfare function assigns to the active players’ strategy choices. (This procedure, 
when applied to the exclusion game, yields the payoff matrix shown in Figure 4 in section 3.13) 
 
The next step in constructing the model is the definition of the function F by using indexes of 
conformity to (two) players. First, player i’s conditional conformity index measures i’s degree of 
                                                 
13 Formally, T is given by the Nash social welfare function N: ∏
=
−==
N
i
iiN cUUUNT
1
1 ),(),...()(σ  where ci is the 
disagreement utility resulting from the breakdown in the negotiation. In an exclusion game the two active 
players 1 and 2 ask either ‘high’, ,2Rd hi =  or ‘low’, ,3Rd li = where i = 1, 2 and R is the amount of money 
to be divided in the game. Hence, the third player’s payoff is ),( 21 ddRs +−=  and, in particular, if both active 
players ask ‘low’, .3)( 21 RddRs
ll =+−=  By assuming that ci = 0, the Nash product yields the ordering 
,21212121 sddsddsddsdd
hhhllhll >=>  based on 
(i) ,3),(),( 212121
max RddddNddT llllll ××==  
(ii) ,6),(
2
),(),( 2121212121 RddddN
sddddNddT hlhllhlhlh ××====  and 
(iii) .00),(),( 212121
min =××== hhhhhh ddddNddT  
See the details in Sacconi and Faillo (2005). 
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deviation from the pure conditional conformity with the norm. The index, which varies from 0 (no 
deviation) to -1 (maximal deviation), is defined as follows (Sacconi and Faillo 2005): 
 
 
)()(
)(),(
),( 1min1max
1max1
1
ii
iii
iii bTbT
bTbT
bf −
−= σσ , where 
 
=1ib  player i’s belief concerning j’s choice; =)( 1max ibT maximum attainable value of T given j’s 
choice according to i’s belief; =)( 1min ibT  minimum attainable value of T given j’s choice 
according to i’s belief; and =),( 1ii bT σ  actual value of T when i chooses strategy iσ  given her 
belief about j’s behaviour. In other words, the deviation index is composed of the difference between 
the value attached to i’s actual choice in the social welfare metrics and the highest value of the 
social welfare metrics calculated on the basis of collectively chosen rule scaled by the  distance 
between the highest and the lowest welfare metrics values.   
 
Although the selected social welfare criterion (the sharing rule) was assumed to be shared by all 
players of the game, the above formula of the conditionality of an actor’s conformity adopts the 
perspective of an individual actor. This is just the idea that an actor’s deviation from the social 
welfare criterion reflects how much she wants to generate the fulfillment of the outcome implied by 
the criterion, given the actor’s beliefs of the other player’s choice (see Grimalda and Sacconi 2005).  
 
Second, player j’s expected reciprocal conformity index measures j’s degree of deviation from 
complete reciprocity in complying with the ideal principle T. This varies from 0 (no deviation at all) 
to -1 (maximal deviation). The index is seen through player i’s beliefs about j’s action and about her 
beliefs concerning i’s choice. The index is defined as follows: 
 
 
)()(
)(),(
),(~ 2min2max
2max21
21
ii
iii
iij bTbT
bTbbT
bbf −
−= , where 
 
=1ib  player i’s first order belief about j’s action, which is formally identical to the strategy of player 
j; =2ib  player i’s second order belief about j’s belief about the action of i, which is formally 
identical to i’s strategy predicted by player j. 
 
Also this formula presents an actor’s perspective to the social welfare criterion. The formula shows 
how player i sees that the player j thinks about i’s conformity to the norm. This brings the principle 
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of mutuality to the model in that it assumes that an actor’s motivation to comply with the norm 
increases the closer she thinks the other player complies with the norm. 
 
The conditionality and reciprocity indexes above are then entered into the ideal component of the 
utility function. This is now defined in the following way: 
 
 )].,(1)][,(~1[ 112 iiiiiji bfbbf σλ ++  
 
This definition states that if player i conforms perfectly to the ideal and if i expects that player j does 
the same, then the values of the two indexes are zero. In this case the resulting utility value of the 
ideal component is iλ . In other words, the player’s i utility value is the same as the importance of 
the ideal component to the player i. On the contrary, if the player i does not entirely conform and 
does not expect the player j to conform either, then both indexes take negative values, possibly -1, 
which yields a smaller utility value than iλ .  
 
Finally, the comprehensive utility function Vi, consisting of a material and an ideal component, can 
be written as follows (ibid.): 
 
 )].,(1)][,(~1[),(),,( 112121 iiiiijiiiiiiii bfbbfbUbbV σλσσ +++=  
 
This function implies that a player adopts the agreed rule if she expects that the other player acts in 
the same way. This also means that conformist preferences (utility from conforming) can induce 
players to choose strategies they would not choose if they consider their material utilities only.  
 
The model can be summarised in the following way. In the beginning there is a material game14 in 
which only the player’s own material payoffs matter. This game is adequately captured by a utility 
function consisting only of a player’s own consequentialist payoffs. Consider, then, the case that the 
game has a social dilemma structure: if the players would contribute to the common interest, then 
everyone would be better off than if everyone only pursues her own self-interest. Several new 
components can be added into the utility function to account for the altered structure of the game. 
The conformist preferences model alters the structure of the game in the following specific way. It 
assumes that an ideal game is involved with the material game in the sense that the interaction of 
strong players has influences on the weak players who, however, can not participate in the actual 
                                                 
14 The terms ‘material’ and ‘ideal’ game come from Grimalda and Sacconi (2005).  
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game as active players. Therefore a strong player’s description of the game now includes also a 
weak player’s payoffs and the utility the strong player derives from the ideal component of the 
utility function defined above. In principle, the normative criterion T can be any principle of taking 
care of other players, especially the weak ones. The model, however, makes a ‘stylised’ case by 
assuming that the players of the game commonly, and as impartial spectators, select a rule to be 
shared by all players of the game. In addition, not only the compliance to the rule but also players’ 
expectations of others’ compliance enter the picture as sources of utility.  
 
Recall now the idea of process-regarding preferences introduced in section 2.2. Clearly, such 
preferences reflect the players’ acceptance of the procedure by which the selection of the rule was 
accomplished. In addition, they may have influences on the players’ behaviour and beliefs and it can 
be hypothesized that if a player sees that the selection of the rule was fair (in that it reflects her 
preferences) it is more likely that the player conforms to the rule and believes that the other players 
also conform to the rule. This hypothesis is studied in section 3.5.3 below.  
 
 
3. Analysis of an explorative experiment 
 
3.1. The outline of the Sacconi and Faillo (2005) experiment and the predictions of the model 
 
Sacconi and Faillo (2005) conducted an exclusion game experiment to assess empirically the 
conformist preferences model. The experiment consisted of three phases in the following way: in 
phase one the subjects played three rounds of exclusion game with a reassignment of the player 
roles in the beginning of each round; in phase two the subjects were divided into three-member 
groups and each group voted the sharing rule according to which the sum of money (12 euros) 
should be divided; in phase three the exclusion game was again played in two rounds and the active 
players made public predictions of the other player’s behaviour just before their own choice.  
 
Figure 2. The exclusion game payoff matrix (Sacconi and Faillo 2005) 
 
   G2  
  3 4 6 
 3 3,  3,  (6) 3,  4,  (5) 3,  6,  (3) 
G1 4 4,  3,  (5) 4,  4,  (4) 4,  6,  (2) 
 6 6,  3,  (3) 6,  4,  (2) 6,  6,  (0) 
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The experimental exclusion game payoff matrix is shown in Figure 2. Two active players (G1 and 
G2) make their own decisions and the passive player (G3) gets the sum which depends on what the 
active players decide.  
 
Figure 3. Sharing principles and rules in the SF experiment (ibid.) 
 
Principles 
Principle 1 
Every player should share the benefits, in 
particular, who has not the possibility to 
choose should not receive less than the 
others. 
Principle 2. 
People who play under a decisional role 
could claim a higher share of benefits. 
Rules 
 G1 G2 G3 
1.1 33 % 25 % 42 % 
1.2 25 % 33 % 42 % 
1.3 33 % 33 % 33 % 
 
 G1 G2 G3 
2.1 50 % 33 % 17 % 
2.2 33 % 50 % 17 % 
2.3 50 % 50 % 0 % 
 
 
In voting the sharing rule the subjects voted one of two general principles and among six specific 
sharing rules derived from the principles (Figure 3.). In the voting procedure the anonymity was 
maintained and no communication among subjects was allowed.  
 
Figure 4. Payoff matrix when the conformist preference model is applied (ibid.) 
 
   
3 
G2 
4 
 
6 
 
3 3,  3 3+ 14
3 λ ,  4+ 22
3λ  3,  6 
G1 
4 4+ 12
3 λ ,  3+ 24
3 λ  4+ 1λ ,  4+ 2λ  4,  6 
 
6 6,  3 6,  4 6,  6 
 
Figure 4 is based on the conformist preferences model and the social welfare metrics explained in 
section 2.3. It shows the individual comprehensive utility values for the exclusion game payoff 
matrix in Figure 2, on the condition that in each state the player’s beliefs reciprocally predict the 
strategy chosen by the opponent. The diagnosis of the game goes now as follows: 
 
(1) if 1λ > 6 - 4 = 2 then player one prefers, in terms of her comprehensive utility function, 
strategy ‘ask for 4’ to strategy ‘ask for 6’ as well as player two; we can define that the 
combination ‘ask for 4’, ‘ask for 4’ is a psychological equilibrium if 1λ > 2; 
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(2) if player one believes that player two does not choose according to the shared principle, she 
does the same and player two decides symmetrically so that both choose ‘ask for 6’; we can 
define that the combination ‘ask for 6’, ‘ask for 6’ is also a psychological equilibrium. 
 
Sacconi and Faillo then produce the following predictions of their model15: 
 
(1) Because the possibly ‘innate’ conformist preferences are inactive in phase one of the game 
almost all players choose ‘ask for 6’; 
(2) A significant part of subjects choose the sharing rule that assigns equal payoffs to all three 
players; 
(3) After having selected the sharing rule, a significant number of players generate expectation 
of reciprocal conformity and choose according to it; 
(4) A significant part of players choose ‘ask for 4’; 
(5) Information that confirms beliefs about conformity of others does not change the 
willingness to conform. 
 
Sacconi and Faillo found evidence in support of the conformist preferences model. As they argue, 
not only the fact that the players changed their behaviour between the phases one and three, but also 
the fact that many players expressed the same strategy choice between the phases, is consistent with  
their theory (given their choice in phase two and their beliefs). In other words, the latter fact does 
not serve as an anomaly of the theory. But, as we shall see, this is not the whole story. The 
introduction of different collective decision-making mechanisms induces some differences in the 
behaviour of subjects in the experiment. 
 
 
3.2. An explorative experiment: design and its evaluation 
 
The explorative experiment, which this paper is based on, was conducted in January 2008 at the 
University of Joensuu (hereafter J08 experiment). The design of the experiment reproduces the main 
structure of the Sacconi-Faillo experiment (hereafter SF experiment) but it also extends it by varying 
the procedures with the help of which the collective decisions were carried out.  
 
 
                                                 
15 As noticed in section 2.3, the inequality aversion theory by Fehr and Schmidt and the fairness equilibrium 
theory by Rabin do not predict correctly in the context of the exclusion game. That is, both of them predict 
(although for different reasons), that the players choose either ‘ask 4’ or ‘ask 6’ both in phase one and in phase 
three. 
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Figure 5. Outline of SF and J08 experiments and of their comparison 
  
 SF experiment:  NrOXrO 
 J08 experiment Ob NrOXrO NrOXrO NrOXrO Oa 
 
In Figure 5 above N refers to non-randomized assignment of subjects to the treatment group (since 
there is only the treatment group). The Os in the figure indicate that certain variables are measured 
both before the treatment (X) and after the treatment. The small letters ‘r’, in turn, refer to the fact 
that the constitution of the sub-groups was randomised before each observation. The symbols Ob and 
Oa refer to measurements done before and after the actual exclusion game experiment. In SF 
experiment there was one treatment and one measurement before and one measurement after the 
treatment. The J08 experiment, on the other hand, adds two more treatments. In addition, it 
incorporates measurements before the exclusion game experiments and after these. The whole 
experiment consisted of three stages and stage two consisted of three sessions (Figure 6.) 
 
Figure 6. Structure of the experiment 
 
Stage one Stage two 
Session one              Session two                  Session three 
Lottery                 Majority voting               Negotiation 
Stage three 
O N  O  X  O N  O  X  O N  O  X  O O 
Dictator game 
Secure game 
Th
re
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ou
nd
s 
be
for
e h
e 
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en
t 
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s 
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As in session one As in session one and 
two 
Evaluation tasks 
 
It is also worth of noticing that none of the three treatments in J08 are identical to the SF treatment. 
In other words, when SF employed the three-person group unanimity voting procedure in selecting 
the sharing rule, J08 made use of the following three procedures: (i) lottery, (ii) a whole-group 
majority voting and (iii) a three-person group negotiation16.  
 
The design allows the construction of several derived variables, such as distribution of payoffs, 
differences between choices before and after the treatment, and differences between the sharing rule 
payoff and a players’ choice. Although the sample size is small (18 subjects/36 – 54 choices) due to 
the preliminary nature of the experiment, some qualified results can be reported from the 
                                                 
16 Before negotiation, the subjects were divided into three-person groups. Each group negotiated within the 
group and selected the sharing rule. No information on the outcomes of the negotiation was distributed to 
other groups. After the negotiation, the same groups played the exclusion game and the roles of the players 
within the group were changed between each round.  
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experiment. Although exact statistical tests ‘correct’ the biases the sparse and unbalanced data may 
cause in the use of asymptotic tests, it can not be ruled out that another sample of subjects would 
possibly produce different results.  
 
The experimental design raises the question of unwanted maturation effects. This means that when 
the subjects enter in session two (and three, respectively) they already are affected by the treatment 
in session one (and two). Table 1 shows that the possibility of these effects cannot be ruled out: the 
choices labelled E (‘equity-oriented’, that is, choice values up to 4) progress in an ascending way in 
before treatments choices 1, 2, and 3, while choices labeled S (‘self-interest-oriented’ choices, 
namely choices 5 and 6) progress in a descending way. However, the Cochran exact test sees no 
statistically significant differences in the before-treatment choices between the sessions (p = .148). 
The same holds for the after treatment choices (p = .841). On the other hand, the chi-square test 
shows that although the choice distributions in the after-treatment choices in session one and in the 
before-treatment choices in session two are different and skew to opposite directions, the difference 
is not statistically significant (p = .061). The same holds between the after-treatment choices in 
session two and the before-treatment choices in session three (p = .236). Since maturing effects are 
obvious, at least in the sense that the end of a session is ‘too similar to’ the beginning of the next 
session, we must keep in mind that these effects may increase the occurrences of the behavioral 
patterns predicted by the conformist preferences theory. At the same time, the maturing effects may 
obscure the effect-size that can be leveled against each treatment.  
 
Table 1. Evaluation of the maturing effects 
 
 Frequencies p-values 
 E S Chi-Square Exact .061 
Chi-Square 
Exact .236 
Cochran 
Exact .148 
Cochran 
Exact .841 
Before treatment 1 12 24   X  
After treatment 1 21 15 X   X 
Before treatment 2 15 21 X  X  
After treatment 2 21 15  X  X 
Before treatment 3 17 19  X X  
After treatment 3 19 17    X 
 
It is also worth of noticing that the treatment in session three (group-negotiation) was substantially 
different from the other two treatments. The treatment allowed that each group selected a sharing 
rule of its own. In consequence, there emerged selections of the ‘active players divide the whole 
cake’ rule, which meant that also the number of choices labelled ‘S’ increased from the conformist 
reasons and not (maybe) from the maturing effects.  
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3.3. Hypotheses 
 
The main purpose of the experiment was to find out whether the different collective decision-
making procedures have different influences on the behaviour of subjects. As was suggested in the 
theoretical section of the paper, it is reasonable to argue that different procedures work differently 
and give birth to different situation-specific perceptions of fairness. Hence, we can set the following 
two hypotheses: 
 
(1) Although the subjects still exhibit conformist motivations, there are differences in how 
many decisions are changed when moved from the ‘before treatment’ to the ‘after treatment’ 
phase; 
(2) The subjects’ perceptions of the fairness of the selection procedures matter; in particular, if 
a subject sees that her own preferences are taken into account, she is more likely to conform to  
the selected rule than otherwise. 
 
 
3.4. Experimental procedures 
 
The subject pool of the experiment consisted of the students in the faculty of Business, Law and 
Economics at the University of Joensuu. The subjects, 18 in total, were recruited by an e-mail 
message. Subjects were paid 5 euros for participation and up to ten euros according to their 
decisions in the experiment. The experiment sessions were run manually and the whole experiment 
lasted approximately 45 minutes. Subjects were given the instructions (including the information in 
Figure 2 and Figure 3) before the experiment. The progress of the experiment was conducted by the 
experimenter by using slides and by distributing separate answering sheets in stages. 
 
The first stage of the experiment consisted of a dictator game and a secure game (see Appendix 1.). 
In each main session in the experiment a subject played the exclusion game for six rounds – three 
rounds before the treatment and three rounds after the treatment. The total number of rounds in stage 
two was eighteen. The subjects were told, that for each subject one round was selected at random 
and subject earnings were derived from it. Regarding stage one, it was told that for each task 
separately, one of the subjects was selected at random for paying for real.  
 
In the exclusion game sessions the subjects were assigned to three-member groups before every 
three-round set. The roles of the players changed so that each player took each of the roles G1, G2, 
and G3 in turn. In five out of six three-round sets the group membership was anonymous. That is, 
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although the subject knew her group label in each three-round set, she didn’t know who the other 
members in the group were.  In the last three-round set the subjects knew the other members in the 
group as the treatment was based on face-to-face negotiation within each group.  
 
The treatments in stage two were conducted in the following way. In the first session the subjects 
were told that one of the six sharing rules in Figure 3 will be selected at random by throwing a dice. 
The dice was thrown by the experimenter, and the outcome was announced for the subjects. In the 
second session the subjects were invited to vote for the sharing rule. Before voting it was told that 
the 50% majority rule will be applied and that new rounds of voting will be conducted until the 
result fulfils the majority condition. The voting was carried out by a secret ballot procedure and the 
winning rule, as well as the scores of the alternatives, was announced to the subjects. In the last 
treatment based of group-negotiation the subjects were first given their group symbols and then 
invited to stand up and to search the group co-members and to negotiate and select the sharing rule 
together. Table 2 shows the distribution of votes in the second session and the distribution of the 
group-negotiated selections in the third session.  
 
Table 2. Votes in session two and selected rules in session three  
 
 Session two: majority voting Session three: group negotiation 
Sharing rule (figure 3) Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
1 (1.1.) 
2 (1.2.) 
3 (1.3) 
4 (2.1.) 
5 (2.2.) 
6 (2.3.) 
- 
1 
10 
- 
1 
6 
- 
5,6 
55,6 
- 
5,6 
33,3 
- 
- 
15 
- 
- 
3 
- 
- 
83,3 
- 
- 
16,7 
Total 18 100 18 100 
 
 
3.5. Results 
 
3.5.1 Choice distributions 
 
The J08 experiment replicated the major outcomes of the SF experiment. The bar charts in Figure 7 
show that the distributions of payoffs changed both when moved within the session (from decisions 
before to decisions after the treatment) and between the sessions. We can see that in all rounds 
before the treatment the mode value was six (euros) but after the treatment four (euros). This 
indicates, if only at a very general level, that the shift in the behaviour of players within each session 
was to the direction predicted by the conformist preference theory. It is worth of noticing, however, 
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that the bar charts below include also the payoffs of the passive players. These are accumulated on 
the low values of horizontal axis and also on value four but not on value six.  
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          Figure7. Players’ choices in the experiment 
 
 
3.5.2 Behavioural patterns and effect-size evaluation 
 
Figure 8 shows the percentage values of the after-treatment behavioural patterns in different 
sessions. Our focus is here on conformist patterns, which are defined as rule-choice-expectation 
patterns (RCEs, in short) that fulfil the following condition: 
 
 R   =   C   =   E17, 
 
where R refers to the payoff implied by the agreed rule, C to the payoff related to the strategy 
chosen and E to the other player’s payoff due to her expected action. Defined in this way, there are 
two conformist patterns in our data. The first one occurs when the jointly agreed rule is the ‘equal-
split’ rule and a player’s strategy choice and expectation coincide with the rule. The second 
conformist pattern occurs, when the players agree on the rule called ‘two active players divide the 
whole cake’, and a player’s strategy choice and expectation coincide with the rule. Let us label the 
former one Res and the latter one Rus . In the J08 experiment, the Rus = C = E patterns occurred only 
in session 3 (with the group-negotiation procedure). 
                                                 
17 One can read this ‘conformer’s reasoning’ in the following way: “My choice pays me out the same amount 
of money that pays out the choice I expect my opponent player will make and, in addition, this amount of 
money equals the payoff implied by the sharing rule I and my co-player(s) have selected”. 
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Figure 8. RCE-patterns in different sessions 
 
One main concern of the experimental analysis was the number of decisions that changed between 
the ‘before-treatment’ and ‘after-treatment’ choices. Related to this, the first hypothesis in section 
3.3 suggested that there are differences between the treatments. The McNemar test was performed to 
study the difference between before-treatment and after-treatment behaviour. The difference is 
significant only in the case of the lottery-treatment (p = .006).  The disappearance of the significance 
in the other two treatments is a likely result of the unwanted maturation effects mentioned in section 
3.2. Accordingly, as Figure 9 shows, the number of equity-oriented choices increases in the before-
treatment phases when moving from session one to sessions two and three.  
 
A straightforward (but statistically debatable) interpretation of the McNemar test indicates the 
following effect-sizes18: 
 
 Lottery treatment:  41,7 (%) 
 Majority voting treatment:  47,6 (%) 
 Group negotiation:  62,5 (%)  
 
The effect sizes above should be taken with reservations, since the obvious maturing effects 
decrease the row sum of cells c and d (see footnote 18). Note also, that the group-negotiation 
procedure allowed the agreement on the group-specific sharing rule. Indeed, one group agreed on 
the rule 2.3 (the active players divide the cake and the passive player gets nothing). The choices of 
this group are removed from the effect-size calculation.  
                                                 
18 There is no standard measurement of the effect-size in McNemar test. The effect-size e is here calculated 
from the formula e = c/(c + d)x100 when the 2x2 table is:   
a b 
c d 
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After 
Before E S 
E 11 1 
S 10 14 
 
After               
Before E S 
E 11 4 
S 10 11 
 
After 
Before E S 
E 14 3 
S 5 14 (6)* 
McNemar p = .006 
Lottery selection procedure 
McNemar p = .090 
Majority voting procedure 
McNemar p = .363 
Group negotiation procedure 
*The figure in the brackets shows the number of S-choices by players who agreed on the 2.3. rule in this session. 
 
Figure 9. Comparison of equity-oriented (E) and self-interest-oriented (S) distributions of choices 
before and after the sharing rule selection  
 
Taken together, the analysis of conformist patterns and the evaluation of the effect-sizes suggest that 
the portion of conformist patterns increased when moving from session one to sessions two and 
three. In addition, the effect-size increased respectively (although only symptomatically). There can 
be (at least) two reasons to this: maturation effects and procedural fairness considerations. 
Maturation effects are obvious, especially the effects of information spreading, since the majority 
voting procedure revealed information on how the votes on the sharing rules were distributed. As 
will be shown in subsection 3.5.4, the relation between the behaviour in the dictator game (and the 
secure game) and the behaviour in the exclusion game changed substantially after the completion of 
the majority voting procedure. The experimental design does not allow, however, a closer analysis 
of the information effects. Instead, the influence of fairness perceptions is analyzed below. 
 
3.5.3 The influence of fairness perceptions 
 
The second hypothesis in section 3.3 suggests that if a player sees that the procedure of jointly 
selecting the sharing rule is fair, she is more likely to exhibit conformist preferences than otherwise. 
This means that a player’s fairness perception influences on what she believes the others will do and 
on what she herself will do. This was investigated by measuring the subjects’ perceptions by two 
devices – viz. by a questionnaire type Likert scale measurement and by the so called IOS scale 
(Inclusion of Other in the Self scale). The Likert-scale measurement was applied by asking the 
subjects to indicate whether they think a given procedure was ‘very fair’, ‘fair’, ‘unfair’, or ‘very 
unfair’. The items which they were asked to rank were different decision procedures in general 
(lottery, negotiation, majority voting, and expert system) and the decision procedures used in the 
experiment. The IOS-scale, on the other hand, measures the subject’s conception of her standing 
relative to the other participants in the decision-making (see De Cremer et al. 2005). The method is 
based on the idea that a subject is given different descriptions of her standing with the help of 
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variously adjusted circles, where one circle represents the subject and the other circles stand for the 
others (see Appendix 2). The subject then selects the description which corresponds with her 
conception. Regarding the experiment reported here, we can interpret that if the subject saw that she 
was an outsider in a group, she conceived the decision-making as unfair in the sense that her voice 
was not taken into account (‘no-voice’ category in the analysis reported below). On the other hand, 
if the subject saw that she was a member of the group, she thought the decision-making was fair as 
her voice was taken into account (‘voice’ category). This interpretation highlights the voice-
dimension of procedural fairness in that it indicates the extent to which the actors who were affected 
by the collective decision saw they had an opportunity to contribute to the decision-making. 
 
The majority of the subjects took a view that the various collective decision-making procedures are 
fair or very fair in general (Table A3.1 in Appendix 3). The same actually holds for the attitudes 
towards the procedures employed in the experiment except that here seven out of eighteen subjects 
regarded lottery mechanism as unfair or very unfair. An interesting notion was made in the 
statistical analysis (one-tailed Fisher’s exact test) of the relationship between fairness rating and 
subject behaviour. Namely, those who rated voting mechanism and group-negotiation as generally 
fair or very fair, exhibited very often equity-oriented choices in corresponding after-treatment phase 
in the experiment; respectively, those who rated these mechanisms as generally unfair or very 
unfair, exhibited only self-interest-oriented choices (p = .003 in the voting treatment and p = .006 in 
the group-negotiation treatment). No other significant relationships, however, were found regarding 
the Likert-scale rankings. This needs, of course, closer scrutiny in the future experiments.  
 
Table 3. Fairness perception and the deviation of choices from the agreed rule 
 
Majority voting Group negotiation  
Conforms Deviates Total p* Conforms Deviates Total p* 
No voice 
Voice 
Total 
4 
16 
20 
12 
3 
15 
16 
19 
35 
 
.001 
6 
19 
25 
8 
3 
11 
14 
22 
36 
 
.009 
 *Fisher’s exact test 
 
The IOS scale measurements produced preliminary and useful information on how procedural 
fairness perceptions may influence on the subjects’ behaviour in the experiment (regarding 
frequencies, see Table A3.2, Appendix 3). Accordingly, Table 3 above shows how many ‘no voice’ 
vs. ‘voice’ choices conformed to or deviated from the collectively selected sharing rule. As can be 
seen, the ‘voice’ choices conform more often to the rule than ‘no voice’ choices (p = .001 in the 
majority voting treatment and  p = .009 in the group-negotiation treatment; one-tailed Fisher’s exact 
test).  
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The analysis shows also that one’s perception of the fairness of the decision-making was related to 
what one believed the other parties in the game will do. A one-tailed Fisher’s exact test was 
performed to study the relation between one’s perception of the situation and one’s prediction of 
what the other players will do. As shown in Table 4, the relation between these variables was 
significant in the majority voting treatment (p = .018) and in the group-negotiation treatment (p = 
.013). Those who conceived their voice was taken into account predicted more often than the others 
that her opponent players conform to the jointly agreed rule.  
 
Table 4. Fairness perception and the deviation of one’s beliefs (of others’ choice) from the agreed 
rule 
Majority voting Group negotiation  
Conforms Deviates Total p* Conforms Deviates Total p* 
No voice 
Voice 
Total 
15 
27 
42 
9 
3 
12 
24 
30 
54 
 
.018 
13 
30 
43 
8 
3 
11 
21 
33 
54 
 
.013 
 *Fisher’s exact test 
 
Finally, it is interesting to see whether there is a relationship between fairness perception and RCE-
patterns. This was studied by performing (again) a one-tailed Fisher’s exact test. The relation was 
significant in the majority voting treatment (p = .014) and in the group-negotiation treatment (p = 
.005). Table 5 shows that if the subject thought her voice was taken into account in the collective 
decision, she produced more often conformist RCA-patterns than otherwise. Respectively, if the 
subject saw that her voice was not taken into account, she produced non-conformist patterns more 
often than otherwise. This suggests an interpretation that the ‘voice’-condition is an important and 
influential dimension in procedural fairness: if the players see that they were participants of the 
social choice, they are very likely to conform to the selected rule and expect that also others 
conform to the rule. 
 
Table 5. Fairness perception and the RCE-patterns after the majority voting procedure and after the 
group-negotiation procedure 
 
Majority voting Group negotiation  
Conformist Non-conformist Total p* Conformist Non-conformist Total p* 
No voice 
Voice 
Total 
5 
14 
19 
11 
5 
16 
16 
19 
35 
 
.014 
4 
17 
21 
10 
5 
15 
14 
22 
36 
 
.005 
            *Fisher’s exact test 
 
We can conclude, if only on the basis of a small-scale data, that in the experiment players’ 
perception of the fairness of the collective decision making procedure had an influence on their 
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behaviour and on their beliefs about the other players’ behaviour. In particular, if a player thinks 
that her preferences are reflected in the collective choice of the sharing rule, it is likely that she 
behaves in the way predicted by the conformist preference theory. The result is similar to the one 
found by DeCramer et al. (2005, 401) in a different, but related context of cooperation managing. 
These results give support to the idea presented in section 2.2 that economic theories of human 
behaviour should pay more attention to the questions and aspects of procedural fairness. Regarding 
the conformist preference theory, the outcome encourages the investigation of an additional 
component of fairness to be integrated into the theory. 
 
3.5.4 Selected observations of the dictator game and the secure game 
 
The experiment reported here consisted also of two tasks that are of secondary interest in this paper. 
First of the tasks was a ‘choosing to take’ version of a dictator game (Rubinstein 1999) and the other 
was the game labelled as ‘relying on other’s rationality’ also called a ‘secure’ game (ibid.). In a 
dictator game a player is asked to tell the sum of money she chooses to take herself in dividing ten 
euros between herself and another player. In a two-player secure game player 1 chooses between 
two actions A and B: action A yields the outcome (5; 5) if player 2 chooses A and (0; 4) if player 2 
chooses B; respectively, the outcomes are (2; 2) and (3; 3) if player 1 chooses B (see Appendix 1). 
We here study tentatively, whether there is any relationship between the behaviour of subjects in 
these games and in the exclusion game. 
 
Figure 10. Choices in the dictator and secure games 
 
 
Figure 10 shows the choices in the dictator game and secure game. In the case of the dictator game 
the symmetry of the percentage distribution of choices is outstanding: proportions of equal split (5; 
5) and absolutely unequal split (10; 0) are even, and the middle-value 7,5 divides the observations in 
half. We can interpret that those players who chose to take a medium share (from 5 to 7 euros) of the 
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whole sum had a stronger other-regarding motivation than those who chose to take a large share 
(from 8 to 10 euros). A Fisher’s exact test was performed to study the relation between choices in 
the dictator game and the choices in the exclusion game. The relation was significant in choices after 
the lottery treatment and in choices before the voting treatment (p = .020, one-tailed Fisher’s exact 
test in both cases). In these choices the medium share takers of the dictator game exhibited more 
often equity-oriented preferences in the exclusion game than did the large share takers. 
Respectively, the large share takers exhibited more often self-interest-oriented preferences than the 
medium share takers. Since the relationship disappeared in the later choices in the experiment, we 
can not reach any unambiguous interpretation. However, it can be suggested with reservations that 
(i) the subjects learned to play the exclusion game after the lottery treatment (as they found their 
other-regarding preferences) and that (ii) the nature of the game changed after information on other 
players’ preferences was distributed in the majority voting treatment. Again, additional experiments 
with proper designs are called for. 
 
Regarding the secure game, the proportion of those who exhibited non-reliance was 33,8% which is 
slightly smaller than was the corresponding average in Beard and Beil’s (1994) original study of the 
game. By leaning on the interpretation of Beard and Beil we can suggest that (i) if a player chooses 
action A, she relies that her opponent player is rational and chooses also action A and, that (ii) if a 
player chooses B, she attaches some probability to the non-maximizing behaviour of an opponent 
player. Alternatively, we can interpret that if a player chooses B she attaches value to her own 
independence, that is, to not having to rely on someone other’s choice.19  
 
Statistical tests (one-tailed Fisher exact test) brought out some interesting results (see Appendix 3 
Tables A3.3-A3.5). An interesting finding was that one’s reliance on others’ rationality was 
associated to the choice patterns in the experiment and to the information that was available of the 
other players. Accordingly, there was an indication that those who relied on the rationality of others, 
favoured self-oriented choices in all choices until the majority voting procedure was carried out. 
After this, the ‘reliers’ shifted towards equity-oriented choices. No such shift happened in the group 
of ‘non-reliers’, however. Majority of them favoured the equity-oriented choices in all rounds except 
the last one (after the group-negotiation).  
 
We can also adopt the interpretation that when a subject chooses the option B in the secure game, 
she attaches value to her independence of the other subjects’ choices. It would then be suggested 
that maybe the valuing of independence has a relation to the voice dimension in assessing the 
fairness of the decision mechanism. Fisher’s one-tailed exact test (Table 6) shows that this indeed 
                                                 
19 Beard and Beil (1994) refer to Slovic (1987) as a source of the alternative interpretation.  
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was the case (p = .013) in the context of the group-negotiation treatment (but not the other 
treatments). In other words, when a subject exhibited esteem for independence, she very often 
thought she was an outsider in the group-negotiation procedure.  
 
Table 6. Relying on the rationality of others vs. voice-dimension (group-negotiation treatment) 
 
 
 
 
The comparison of the behaviour in the dictator and secure game with the behaviour in the exclusion 
game brought some interesting insights into the factors that are in operation in an exclusion game 
experiment. One way to use dictator game and secure games would be to take them as controlling 
variables. Another way would be to open with them new interpretations concerning, for example, 
the factors driving the processes of agreeing to a norm in the exclusion game.  
 
 
4. Discussion 
 
In general, the results of the exploratory experiment are in line with the results of Sacconi and 
Faillo’s (2005) experiment. In both experiments a significant number of players conformed to the 
rule they had jointly agreed upon. Since punishing of deviators from the rule was not possible, the 
adoption of the rule can be interpreted as an activation of the players’ inherent valuation of the rule 
and the general constitutive ideal behind it. Both experiments give lend to the idea, that many people 
are motivated not only by material consequences of their decisions but also by their willingness to 
adopt a rule or an ideal. Naturally, the experiment reported here brings only a limited increase to the 
robustness of the original result by Sacconi and Faillo. In spite of all, it can be suggested that the 
future investigations should both replicate the result and focus on the procedures of agreeing on a 
norm to find out what is the best way, in a given situation, to select a norm to get the participants to 
cooperate for mutual benefit.  
 
The analysis suggests that the future investigation should also pay attention to the fairness issues 
related to conformist behaviour. An important issue is the voice condition with the meaning that (i) 
some social choice mechanisms are more respectful than others towards the members of the 
deciding group, and that (ii) some people see a particular process as a fair one (in the sense of 
reflecting their preferences) while others may think of it as an unfair process external to their own 
desires preferences. An important tentative finding was that if a player perceived a given mechanism 
 IOS-scale  
Relies on the rationality of others Outsider Insider Total p* 
Yes 2 10 12 
No 5 1 6 
Total 7 11 18 
 
.013 
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as a fair way to reach a joint agreement, it was more likely that the player’s own choices and her 
beliefs of others’ choices ‘coincided’ and that the resulting behavioural pattern was conformist.  
 
In addition, the analysis demonstrated that in such a behavioural experiment as the exclusion game 
experiment is, there are ‘other factors’ at work, such as learning effects, information effects, other-
regarding preferences and the subject’s attitude towards others. The ‘other factors’ may either 
strengthen or debase the influences of the conformist motivation or fairness impacts and further 
knowledge of them is important in theory development as well as in designing new experiments. 
The major ‘finding’ in the analysis was that the secure game was able to identify players who value 
their own independence of the actions and decisions of others. This opens new insights into the 
group dynamics in collective decision making which naturally needs more attention in the future 
studies. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Economists have been interested in fairness of economic allocations and states for quite a long time. 
Recent theories of social preferences incorporate a handful of new aspects of fairness issues into 
economic theories. In spite of this, there is still lack of knowledge on how the fairness of procedures 
affect on the behaviour of individuals. This paper attempts to associate the question of procedural 
fairness to the study of conformist preferences as an explanation of why individuals in experiments 
and also in field settings often choose a cooperative or an equity-oriented strategy rather than the 
strategy which maximizes the personal material payoffs of the acting individual.  
 
The results of the analysis suggest, albeit on the basis of limited evidence, that conformist and 
process-regarding preferences may outweigh the self-interested preferences in contractarian social 
dilemma situations. In these situations individual and collective interests are at odds but the 
individuals have a possibility to jointly agree on a norm to be voluntary followed later on. In other 
words, the study demonstrates that norms and fairness can be stronger sources of motivation than 
the motivation to maximize one’s own material outcomes. The operation of reciprocal conformism 
has already been demonstrated by Sacconi and Faillo (2005), but the present study encourages 
investigating also the influences of procedural fairness on the behaviour of individuals.  
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Appendix 1. Choice tasks in stage one in the experiment 
 
Question 1 
 
Imagine, that your professor selects two students in a class. One of the students is assigned the role of player 1 
and the other player 2. A sum of money, 10 euros, will be divided between these two players according to 
player 1’s choice in the following clause: 
 
”I will divide 10 euros in the following way: N euros to me and the rest to the other.” 
 
The payments are then made anonymously. 
 
What is your choice of N? Answer _______ 
 
 
 
 
Question 2 
 
You are player 1 in a two-player game the payoff matrix of which is below (in euros). You choose either A or 
B without knowing what is player 2’s choice (A or B). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is your choice, A or B ? Answer _______ 
 
 
 
 
 
Player 2  
A B 
A  You 5; Other 5 You 0; Other 4Player 1 
B  You 2; Other 2 You 3; Other 3
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Appendix 2.  IOS scale task as applied to the group-negotiation 
 
‘Below you see four alternative descriptions of your own standing relative to the other two members 
of your group in the group-negotiation procedure. Which of the alternatives best describes you own 
perception?’ 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
1
You
You You 
2
You 
3 4
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Appendix 3. Tables to section 3.5. 
 
Table A3.1. Rankings of fairness 
 
 Attitude in general Attitude in the experiment 
 Lottery Voting Negotiation Expert system Lottery Voting Negotiation 
Very fair 
Fair 
Unfair 
Very unfair 
6 
8 
3 
1 
5 
10 
2 
1 
4 
11 
3 
- 
1 
13 
3 
1 
5 
6 
5 
2 
3 
14 
1 
- 
6 
11 
1 
- 
 
 
Table A3.2. IOS-scale 
 
 Lottery Voting Negotiation 
No-voice 
  Description 1 
  Description 2 
Voice 
  Description 3 
  Description 4 
 
10 
1 
 
3 
4 
 
7 
1 
 
3 
7 
 
3 
4 
 
1 
10 
 
 
Table A3.3. Choices in the secure game against choices in the exclusion game: before treatments 
 
Before lottery Before voting Before negotiation 
Choice 
Relies 
 
E 
 
S 
Fisher exact  
p-value  
(1-sided) 
Choice 
Relies 
 
E 
 
S 
Fisher exact  
p-value  
(1-sided) 
Choice 
Relies 
 
E 
 
S 
Fisher exact  
p-value  
(1-sided) 
Yes 5 19 Yes 5 19 Yes 9 15 
No 7 5 
.031 
No 10 2 
.001 
No 8 4 
.09 
 
 
Table A3.4. Choices in the secure game against choices in the exclusion game: after treatments 
 
After lottery After voting After negotiation 
Choice 
Relies 
 
E 
 
S 
Fisher exact  
p-value  
(1-sided) 
Choice 
Relies 
 
E 
 
S 
Fisher exact  
p-value  
(1-sided) 
Choice 
Relies 
 
E 
 
S 
Fisher exact  
p-value  
(1-sided) 
Yes 10 14 Yes 13 10 Yes 13 11 
No 11 1 
.004 
No 8 4 
.417 
No 6 6 
.546 
 
 
Table A3.5. Choices in the secure game against prediction of other’s choices 
 
After lottery After voting After negotiation 
Predicts 
Relies 
 
E 
 
S 
Fisher exact  
p-value  
(1-sided) 
Predicts 
Relies 
 
E 
 
S 
Fisher exact  
p-value  
(1-sided) 
Predicts 
Relies 
 
E 
 
S 
Fisher exact  
p-value  
(1-sided) 
Yes 8 16 Yes 21 2 Yes 18 6 
No 10 2 
.006 
No 6 6 
.011 
No 4 8 
.020 
 
 
